July
29 commemorates an event that never happened.
On that day in 1958, the United States had been scheduled to conduct an “all-up”
test of its newest air defense weapons and systems against live targets, and
using the new live nuclear warheads of this new generation of manned
interceptors and guided surface-to-air missiles. All of
this was to be controlled from the ground by the amazing computerized SAGE system, the first
large-scale use of radically-new digital computers.
Forming the
future close-in defense of major industrial areas would be the Nike Hercules missile, raised to launch
position from underground silos and automatically directed by radar
command-guidance to intercept a target with either a high explosive warhead or
one of two different versions of the W-31 nuclear warhead.
Defending
the perimeter of North American airspace would be left to the new F-101B, still
under development but due to enter service the following year. Designed to a specification to be able to
score a minimum of three bomber kills per interceptor, the F-101B carried a
brace of nuclear-tipped MB-1 Genie
rockets in addition to a pair of Falcon
missiles with small high explosive warheads.
Almost sixty
years later, the notion of using nuclear weapons to defend the territory of the
United States and Canada seems patently insane.
One live test of the Genie had
been conducted a year previously over a small group of observers less than
20,000 feet below an explosion equivalent to 2,000 tons of TNT. All
six of the men involved developed cancer although it did not contribute to the
deaths of those who have passed away since the Plumbbob John test in 1957.
The photographer in later years dismissed it as a propaganda stunt,
meant to build acceptance by the American people of the notion of using nuclear
weapons over their homes and cities by “demonstrating” their safety.
The Genie rocket, in particular, is singled
out as the result of the paranoid atmosphere of the 1950s along with the “Red
Scare,” “Communist witch hunts,” and the like.
Playing upon a perception of defending virginal American airspace
against the Red hordes crossing the North Pole in massive bomber formations,
the Genie is portrayed as a defense
against mass formations of Soviet bombers.
History, in its context, shows this perception to be inaccurate. Facing an enemy force that would use
defensive formation tactics during the initial penetration of North American
airspace and anticipating the development of high speed, high altitude manned
bombers and pilotless cruise missiles, the Genie
was an expedient solution to both sets of problems that could be developed
and fielded relatively quickly. The
F-101B Voodoo would provide an interceptor
with the payload, range, speed, and climb performance to use these weapons
effectively, even against targets that could fly higher and faster than the Voodoo.
When
development was undertaken in 1954, the near-term threat consisted of jet or
turboprop-powered long range bombers that combined high subsonic speed with
good altitude capability, cruising at about 40,000 feet. In Soviet design practice, these bombers
retained defensive gun armament that would be used within a small formation of
bombers to provide mutual defensive gunfire support against American and
Canadian interceptors, which at the time did not have a significant performance
edge over the new Tu-95 Bear and M-4 Bison bombers. Special aircraft modified to “jam” defensive
radars and ground-to-air communications would also be fielded alongside the
bombers, and were also equipped with guns.
During the initial penetration of enemy airspace, the Soviet bombers
would maintain close formation to maximize both defensive firepower and the
effectiveness of their electronic “screen” against searching American and
Canadian radars. As they closed to
within a couple of hundred miles of their targets, the bombers would split up
and proceed individually, relying on speed and confusion for their
survival. By that time, the Soviets had
dropped high-yield atomic and hydrogen weapons from their new bombers during
tests. Fearing the consequence of a
weapon with 20 to 100 times the destructive power of the bombs that leveled the
Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, American planners needed a
defense that would stop them cold.
That weapon
came in the form of the MB-1 Genie,
armed with a W-25 warhead producing an explosive yield of 1.7 kilotons, about
1/10th the yield of the “Little Boy” bomb dropped over Hiroshima. Fielded in 1957 on the best long-range
interceptor of the time, the Northrop F-89 Scorpion,
the power and the tactical employment of the weapon was hampered by the limited
performance capability of the Scorpion. Woefully underpowered and limited in flight
speed due to its straight-wing design, the F-89 would be barely adequate to
face new jet bombers, and would be hopelessly outmatched facing bombers or
other weapons with increased altitude capabilities or higher speeds. The Genie
did give the older interceptor some capability to make attacks from the
front of the target and to “snap-up” and launch at a target at a higher
altitude.
Genie-equipped aircraft were based along
the peripheries of the United States in the hope of catching Incoming Soviet
bombers in their small defensive formations of three or four aircraft. Producing a 1,000-foot diameter fireball, the
W-25 warhead of the Genie was deemed
potent enough to knock down a bomber aircraft within a half mile of the
detonation point. Armed with two Genies apiece, the F-89s stood a chance
of knocking down several bombers apiece, if they were lucky to catch them in
close formation. Each bomber destroyed
meant a city and its inhabitants saved.
Soviet
planners realized the potential of American defensive improvements, and soon
began work on measures to negate them.
One was to increase the ceiling to the basic Tu-95 Bear design from 40,000 feet to 55,000 feet, putting it above the
combat ceiling of most American interceptors.
Strategic Air Command, the bomber force of the U.S. Air Force, had done
the same with its obsolescent B-36 piston-engine bombers under the “Featherweight”
program that proved an effective counter against Soviet interceptors. America had also begun work on a supersonic
bomber, the B-58, that could fly at twice the speed of sound and over 50,000
feet. A pilotless, supersonic cruise
missile was also under development, the SM-64 Navaho, which would fly at three times the speed of sound and
70,000 feet.
Given the
apparent recent progress in the Soviet nuclear weapons program, Western
technological superiority could no longer be taken for granted. Although there were glaring gaps in American
intelligence efforts at that time in the mid-1950s, it was reasonable to assume
that the Soviets were also pursuing parallel developments. As the historical record now shows, they
were, although with variable levels of success.
By the late 1950s, what would have to be in place to counter such
developments? In 1954, the U.S. Air
Force had placed all of its eggs in one basket for an advanced new interceptor,
the F-102. Facing innumerable delays
with its intricate fire control system, armament, and engines, the Air Force by
then had settled on an interim version that was barely supersonic and lacked nuclear
weapons capability: the F-102A. The “ultimate”
version, the F-106, would not be ready until the 1959-1960 time frame. Capable of Mach 2 performance and outstanding
climb capability, the F-106 would not have the range needed to adequately
defend the perimeter of North American airspace and, limited to one MB-1 Genie rocket, would effectively have
half the defensive capability against penetrating Soviet bomber
formations. Something with the range to
meet that threat, the payload to carry two Genies,
and high supersonic performance approaching that of the F-106 was needed
quickly. The one basic design available
that could fulfill that role was for an aircraft under development whose “strategic
fighter” mission was already becoming obsolescent, the McDonnell F-101A Voodoo.
With a radius of nearly 1,000 miles, ability to climb to 40,000 feet in
two minutes, and a top speed of 1,000 miles-per-hour, the Voodoo could be adapted to meet future threats anticipated for the
late 1950s.
Essentially
borrowing the already-tested radar, fire control system, and engines from the
ongoing F-102A project, the interceptor Voodoo,
dubbed the F-101B, would have a top speed approaching Mach 2 and promised an
ability to “snap-up” to altitudes of 60,000 feet and more. Flight testing of the F-101A showed that even
with the basic engines the latter capability was possible and that engaging
targets at 60,000 feet and higher would be no problem with suitable armament
and a fire control system to direct it.
The armament would be mounted on a novel rotary weapons bay door. On the “outside” would be a pair of
conventionally-armed Falcon guided
missiles launched from retractable rails.
Rotating the door 180 degrees would expose a pair of large MB-1 Genie rockets, normally nestled inside
of the fuselage to reduce drag. The
basic Hughes MG-3 fire control system of the F-102A was modified for a two-seat
rather than single-seat presentation and with firing circuits for the Genie to yield the MG-13 fire control
system. Flight testing in the spring and
early summer of 1958 demonstrated that the new Voodoo could intercept targets while flying at speeds in excess of
Mach 1.4, or about 900 miles-per-hour.
The time came to put it to the test.
The
detonation of relatively low-yield air-to-air or surface-to-air warheads high over
American cities was a small price to pay in comparison to the utter devastation
of even a single Soviet atomic bomb. As
it turns out, the most powerful bomb available to the Soviet Union at that time
would have been the RDS-27 with a yield of 215 kilotons, less than the
400-kiloton RDS-6 device that it was derived from, or the 3-megaton RDS-37
device that was to be delayed until 1962 before entering service with Soviet
Long-Range Aviation units. The blast
from the RDS-27 would be sufficient to knock down most structures over a radius
of several miles from the blast point, and dropped over a large urban area
would instantly kill hundreds of thousands, if not millions.
The videos
that we see of grown men seeming to play a child’s game with atomic weapons
blasting overhead must be seen in the light of the absolutely obscene
destructive power and massive loss of American lives that it was meant to
stop. But even in 1958, not everyone saw
it that way. During the course of July
of that year, the governments of Mexico and pre-Castro Cuba were not at all keen on the opening of a
third nuclear weapons test range in the Gulf of Mexico. Due to the diplomatic sensitivities involved
with countries that were then mot on the best of terms with the United States,
the live test was canceled just a few days before it was to occur. The Nike
missile was eventually tested with a live W-31 warhead in the Pacific
during Operation Dominic, but the Voodoo was never to be tested with a
live weapon. Fortunately, it has also
never had occasion to fire one in defense of the United States or Canada, which
both went on to operate the Voodoo
and its Genie armament into the early
1980s.