Voodoos vs. MiGs: 1965-1968

Selected North Vietnamese pilots had begun training in China to operate MiG-15s and MiG-17s in 1960.   By the end of 1962 this contingent received 36 MiG-17F “Fresco-C” fighters to form the first fighter squadron of the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF), the 921^st Fighter Regiment, but both the unit and its aircraft remained in China.  In the aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the 921^st Fighter Regiment was recalled from China and arrived at Noi Bai airport (known to the Americans as Phuc Yen) near Hanoi on 6 August 1964.  In April 1965, North Vietnamese MiG-17s made their first kills of the war when two MiG-17Fs of the 921^st Fighter Regiment shot down two F-105Ds of the 355^th TFW near Thanh Hoa.  Maj. F. E. Bennett and Capt. J. A. Magnuson were killed in action.  The threat of MiGs had appeared, but then seemed to fade afterwards.  Of greater concern to mission planners was new imagery of two SA-2 “Guideline” surface-to-air missile sites under construction.  Concerned about the MiG threat, in June 1965 CINCPAC in Hawai’i ordered daily photo coverage of all jet-capable airfields in North Vietnam above 20-degrees North latitude.  Green Python RF-101Cs from Udorn RTAFB covered the requirement on odd days, Navy RF-8As on even days.  Effective 7 September 1965, the VPAF formed a second fighter squadron, the 923^rd Regiment, equipped with MiG-17s.  By this time, the 921^st had begun conversion to the MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C” and operated both types.  On 18 September 1965, the Americans discovered eight MiG fighters photographed at a new base at Kep Airfield, 35 nautical miles northeast of Hanoi, along with 24 shipping crates at Phuc Yen.  Soon, US intelligence analysts noted that the North Vietnamese were demonstrating proficiency in GCI control of MiGs.  By early November, CINCPAC expressed concern that MiGs might present a greater threat to recon aircraft.  2nd Air Division assured CINCPAC that the speed and maneuverability of the RF-101C would be sufficient defense against MiG-15 and MiG-17 interceptors.

VPAF pilots of the 923^rd Fighter Regiment on the flight line with their new MiG-17F “Fresco-C” interceptors. USAF.

The MiGs were the newest threat, but others remained more concerning. While anti-aircraft guns remained the deadliest component of North Vietnamese air defenses, planners continued to cast a wary eye on the increasing numbers of SA-2 sites being discovered in North Vietnam, especially after the brief and unsuccessful introduction of the QRC-160 ECM pod in the spring of 1965.  Throughout the course of May 1965, U-2 aircraft monitored the emplacement of more sites surrounding Hanoi.  RF-101Cs could not provide detailed photography of the sites due to the 40 nautical mile range restriction around Haiphong and the MiG base at Phuc Yen.  It had been noticed that MiGs would not be scrambled against targets outside of the 40-mile radius.

Engagement envelopes of guns and surface to air missiles encountered during the conflict in Indochina. USAF.

The North Vietnamese MiGs tangled with the Voodoo for the first time on 12 October 1965.  A pair of RF-101s conducting a mission near Yen Bai, 30 miles northwest of Hanoi, reported taking cannon fire from a pair of MiG-17s, but received no damage.  A month later, on 15 November 1965, two 15^th TRS RF-101Cs were flying at 9,000 feet photographing an objective at Yen Bai when they encountered a pair of MiGs passing behind them at 15,000 feet, setting up in a high left perch, and then diving right to open fire on the wingman.  After completing his photo run, the lead RF-101Cs egressed at maximum speed toward friendly territory.  Meanwhile, the wingman descended to 500 feet AGL and maximum speed, transiting Yen Bai at 100 feet.  The MiG-17s, flying into the face of ferocious anti-aircraft fire directed toward the Voodoos from a significant portion of the 200 AAA pieces at Yen Bai, broke off their attack and the second RF-101s successfully returned to Udorn after the pilot flew into a fog-filled valley and used the tremendous power of his Voodoo to execute a rapid climb to 44,000 feet.  On 26 November, two more Voodoos conducting a mission north of Yen Bai were engaged by four MiG-17s diving at them and opening fire with their cannons from a range of 4,000 feet.  The RF-101s broke left and dived down to 200 feet, losing sight of the MiGs and returning home.  Within a month, the new MiG-21s of the 921^st regiment were known to be active.  At about the same time, the VPAF received the first of ten radar-equipped MiG-17PF “Fresco-D” interceptors.  In late January 1966 the 921^st Fighter Regiment began introduction of the MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C”, taking part in combat missions the following month alongside the more numerous MiG-17.  A number of MiG sightings occurred in February and March 1966, the most notable of which concerned a mission near the Chinese border on 12 February 1966.  A pair of RF-101s had completed a reconnaissance run over an objective in North Vietnam at 40,000 feet when they had apparently strayed inside of Chinese airspace to a point about 5 miles west of where the Tengtiao River crosses the border with North Vietnam.  Two incoming bogeys were sighted on a southerly heading toward them, but abruptly turned west at the time of the sighting.  No positive identification could be made but they were apparently inbound Chinese MiGs.  The Voodoo experienced another reported encounter with MiGs over North Vietnam on 17 March 1966. Two RF-101Cs piloted by Major Hallet P. Marston and Captain Richard M. Cooper were near their objective in the vicinity of Dien Bien Phu when they were engaged by MiG-17s, which made four firing passes.  Dense haze allowed RF-101s to evade further visual contact, engage afterburner and escape, easily outdistancing the pursuing MiGs.

Commander of the VPAF 921^st Fighter Regiment, Major Tran Hanh, in the cockpit of a MiG-21PFM “Fishbed-F” ca. 1970.  The 921^st was the first North Vietnamese unit to field the MiG-21 beginning in April 1966. USAF.

MiG-21PF “Fishbed-D” interceptor of VPAF.  Lacking the cannons and maneuverability of the MiG-17, the MiG-21 had Mach 2 speed and carried either 57-mm rocket pods or AA-2 “Atoll” IR-guided missiles. USAF.

On 23 April 1966, MiG-21s engaged American fighters for the first time with no success. By this time the VPAF received its first MiG-21PF “Fishbed-D” interceptors.  Over the course of the spring of 1966, numerous problems with the R-3S (NATO: AA-2 “Atoll”) missiles and inexperience with the relatively complex fire control system of the MiG-21 resulted in very limited combat effectiveness.  While the initial MiG-21F-13 aircraft were each armed with a single 30-millimeter cannon, the newer MiG-21PF with its much more capable RP-21 radar had no internal cannon and relied solely upon either “Atoll” missiles or 57-millimeter rocket pods.  The North Vietnamese pilots were also required to work within overly strict and inflexible tactical guidelines.  In the case of the MiG-21 pilots, the tactical maneuvers that worked well for the agile MiG-17 proved far less suited to the MiG-21.  With the introduction of the MiG-21, both MiG types underwent a division of labor in which the MiG-21s would engage targets above 8,000 feet, and the MiG-17s anything below 5,000 feet.  Any aircraft in the intermediate zone could be engaged by either type.  However, the SA-2 surface-to-air missile remained the primary defensive weapon.

The reintroduction of ECM pods and changes in tactics to avoid gunfire in the latter half of 1966 caused a change in MiG activity.  To avoid the far more numerous small-caliber AAA weapons, USAF strike aircraft started flying their missions above a minimum altitude of 6,500 feet.  Beginning in the early fall, F-105 units reintroduced improved ECM pods that proved highly effective against both missiles and the fire control radars of the larger-caliber AAA guns.  However, the pods had the disadvantage of highlighting the positions of strike packages on the scopes of North Vietnamese GCI operators, who could triangulate on the American strike aircraft and vector MiGs to those positions.  As a result, VPAF MiG pilots became distinctly more active and aggressive toward the end of 1966.

RF-101C-65-MC 56-0083 of the 45^th TRS departing in afterburner, ca. 1966.  The first aircraft in Southeast Asia to carry camouflage, the original all-black tail markings have been modified with the serial number now in white.  This aircraft carries both nose and tail antennas for the AN/APR-25 RWR system.  NARA via Mark Nankivil.

On New Year’s Day 1967, two RF-101Cs photographing objectives southwest of Hanoi received an electronic indication of approaching MiGs.  Along with much of the fleet, the Voodoos had recently been modified with AN/APR-25 radar warning receivers, which showed an X-Band strobe at their 10 o’clock, moving toward their 9 o’clock position.  The contact then settled into their 6 o’clock at one ring, uncomfortably close.  Taking advantage of dense cloud cover and accelerating to Mach 1.05, the recon aircraft turned for home and noted the high speed of the pursuing aircraft, which were able to remain close enough to remain at two rings on the indicator before the contact broke off pursuit at the Laos border.  The Voodoo pilots could not get a visual identification on the interceptors but due to their speed believed that they were MiG-21s.  However, the next day the North Vietnamese MiG-21 force was dealt a very severe blow on 2 January 1967, courtesy of Operation Bolo, conceived by the staff of the legendary former commander of the 81^st Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Bentwaters and new boss of the 8^th TFW “Wolfpack”, Colonel Robin Olds, claiming seven VPAF MiGs.  While the MiG-17s were directed to remain below the cloud deck over the area, the MiG-21s climbed through to engage what they thought was another strike force of F-105 Thunderchiefs to meet a buzz saw composed of waves of hungry F-4C Phantoms that were loaded for bear with air-to-air missiles.   North Vietnamese MiG-21s would remain out of action for several months as they reformed their depleted ranks while MiG-17 operations continued at a lower level than had been the case previously.

Colonel Robin Olds, former commander of the 81^st TFW ca. October 1967 as commander of the 8^th TFW in Thailand. USAF.

With the North Vietnamese MiG force at least temporarily out of commission, the focus of American defensive efforts shifted back to electronic countermeasures. Much of the effectiveness of the ECM was contingent upon a properly-spaced tactical formation.  The protection afforded by QRC-160A-1 pods was additive, single aircraft were judged to remain somewhat vulnerable.   Although the pods produced extra drag, the effect was offset by a net increase in fuel efficiency due to the reduced need for evasive maneuvering.  With the successful test of the improved QRC-160 equipment after its troublesome introduction in 1965, medium altitude was opened up once again for USAF tactical aircraft.  After the spectacular success of the evaluation, the QRC-160A-1 pod was soon given an official designation as the AN/ALQ-71.  However, although its overall reliability was greatly improved, the ram-air turbine providing power to the electronics proved prone to failure, disabling the pod.  Also, at ranges closer than 8 to 10 nautical miles from the target emitter, the jammed radar would begin to “burn through” and render the pod ineffective.  Due to its radiation pattern, maneuvering flight could negate the pod’s effectiveness.

Rear quarter view of the QRC-160A-1 self-protection ECM pod, accepted into service as the AN/ALQ-71. USAF.

By January 1967, 7^th Air Force now had enough ALQ-71 pods available to begin equipping F-4s and F-105s.  For the time being, the RF-101C was not selected to carry the new ECM pod.  The stated reasons were that RF-101s usually flew alone and would refuse to jam until being tracked by hostile radar.  Therefore, the Navy’s AN/ALQ-51 deception jammer seemed ideal for the Voodoo as it activated automatically after being triggered by signals from a targeting radar.  The ALQ-51 also had the advantage of being internally mounted and therefore avoiding the previous drag and wing twisting problems experienced with the RF-101 when carrying the QRC-160-1 pod in the spring of 1965.  The equipment was initially very effective at countering SA-2 missiles, but during the summer of 1967 RF-101 losses began to mount as North Vietnamese defenses began to rapidly adjust. 7^th Air Force therefore directed withdrawing ALQ-51 units from use after less than a year.  A new directive was issued to resume two-ship RF-101C flights, with each aircraft carrying a pair of ALQ-71 pods under wings.   Due to the detrimental effect on the best defensive qualities of the RF-101, maneuverability and above all speed, it was directed that the Voodoo aircraft remain away from MiG operating areas, leaving these target sets to the faster and more capable RF-4C.  An alternate tactic allowing some more flexibility for the RF-101C was to provide fighter escorts carrying the ALQ-71 pods to provide protection.

Although MiG activity had decreased after Operation Bolo, RF-101s continued to occasionally encounter MiGs in the early months of 1967.  Two weeks after Operation Bolo, on 16 January 1967, an RF-101C inbound at 22,000 feet to photograph a secondary target in Laos about 45 nautical miles southwest of Dien Bien Phu received an X-Band contact on his APR-25 receiver at 1 o’clock, which persisted for three minutes.  He then sighted a silver, swept wing aircraft at 25,000 feet, setting up for an apparent quartering head-on attack.  The pilot broke his Voodoo hard left 180 degrees and descended through a thin cloud deck at 12,000 feet at military power and made his way back to Udorn RTAFB.  Barely two weeks later, 65 nautical miles northwest of Hanoi, a pair of RF-101s climbing through 10,000 feet tallied a pair of MiG-17s orbiting directly overhead.  The Voodoos quickly ducked back down to 100 feet AGL to avoid being noticed and continued their mission.  On 10 February 1967, another pair of RF-101s at 21,000 feet operating over northeastern Laos, about 30 miles from the border with North Vietnam, sighted a MiG on a reciprocal heading at about 35,000 feet and 10 miles.  Heading northwest and crossing into North Vietnamese airspace to a point east of Dien Bien Phu, the Voodoos about 15 minutes later sighted an IL-14 “Crate” transport at 4,000 feet, flying out of Dien Bien Phu.  While the RF-101s were photographing the transport, they noticed an Mi-6 “Hook” heavy transport helicopter in the same vicinity.    

Finally recovered from its mauling at the hands of the Phantoms of Robin Olds’ 8^th TFW “Wolfpack” to open 1967, the MiG-21s of the 921^st Fighter Regiment re-entered the fight during the spring of that year.  Shortly after Operation Bolo, the VPAF high command evaluated what had happened and made changes to ensure that such an event would never happen again.  One of the first adjustments was to change to “hit-and-run” tactics that played to the strengths of the MiG-21, namely speed, acceleration, and presentation of a small, fleeting target.  These qualities were tactically integrated with the positive qualities of the MiG-17, which still formed the backbone of the VPAF.  Attacking MiGs would work primarily in small groups of two to four aircraft approaching at varying altitudes.  The MiG-21s would be positioned to attack American aircraft from above with “Atoll” missiles while the MiG-17s would approach from the sides of approaching strike formations to make the best use of their maneuverability and heavy cannon armament.  The VPAF MiG-21s resumed combat operations on 23 April 1967 with the engagement of USAF F-4Cs.  On 29 April, a MiG-21 was sighted by a Voodoo during a mission over Hoa Loc airfield.  Flying at 15,000 feet, the RF-101 was fired on by an SA-2 when at the same time the pilot noticed the MiG at 4 o’clock and 6 miles, climbing.  There was no further contact and the Voodoo returned to base.  Several days later, on 3 May 1967, the pilots of a pair of Voodoos conducting a mission in North Vietnam 16 miles ENE of Thai Nguyen noticed black puffs 25-50 feet from their aircraft, then observed a single MiG tracking them from their right at 2 miles.  There was no further contact with the MiG.  On 22 May, a pair of RF-101s photographing the Xac Mai motor pool south of Hanoi at 12-14,000 feet observed the launch of two SA-2 missiles.  At the same time the second missile passed them, the Voodoos began to take fire from 85-mm AAA.  A MiG alert soon followed, after which the American pilots noticed what appeared to be two MiG-17s at their 8 o’clock position.  After two more SA-2s were fired at them, they received a MiG call on the Guard frequency just before it cut out due to enemy jamming.  The RF-101s chose to select afterburner for 3 minutes and egress southwest toward Laos to clear the mountains, then dropped to low level to ensure that they shook off any pursuing MiGs.    

Due to the improved tactics and increased familiarity with the MiG-21 and its somewhat cumbersome weapon system, the MiG-21 saw increased activity through the spring and well into the summer of 1967.  On 11 June 1967, an RF-101C on a Blue Tree mission 17 miles southeast of Son La, just north of the border with Laos, was at 25,000 feet when the pilot noticed a MiG-21 with contrails at 30,000 feet and 5 miles.  When the MiG broke right to dive toward the Voodoo, the pilot dropped his external tanks and executed a left diving turn to level off at 100 feet AGL, selected afterburner, and egressed at 620 knots on the deck, picking up an X-Band strobe on his APR-25 display.  The Voodoo pilot noticed that the MiG appeared to parallel his aircraft during his descent but was not observed again after crossing a short distance into Laos.  Numerous MiG warnings were being received that day for 60 miles west to 80 miles northwest of Hanoi.  The luck for the intrepid Voodoo crews was about to run out.  On 16 September 1967, a 20^th TRS RF-101C, 56-0180, was shot down by a MiG-21about 5 miles north of Son La.  The Voodoo was flown by Maj. Bob Bagley as part of two-ship formation photographing the Northwest Railroad.  Bagley was captured and became a POW.   The following day, another 20^th TRS Voodoo, 56-0181, flown by Capt. Bob Patterson, who had been downed by an SA-2 less than three months previously, was also downed by a MiG-21 but fortunately was once again rescued by American forces.  Both aircraft were downed by MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C” fighters assigned to the 921^st “Sao Do” Fighter regiment, using AA-2 Atoll missiles in both cases.  Nguyen Ngoc Do claimed Bagley’s aircraft while flying “4420”, while Pham Thanh Ngan claimed Patterson’s Voodoo in “4520.”  The standard configuration for the RF-101C during such a mission would have called for the carriage of ALQ-71 pods, but these incidents made it clear that they reduced the speed of the Voodoo to such a degree that the RF-101C could be overtaken by the MiG-21 before the interceptors would have to break off due to low fuel.  These two incidents led 7^th Air Force to prohibit further RF-101C missions over the heavily-defended northern areas of North Vietnam, but missions over Laos and the North Vietnam panhandle continued.  The 20^th TRS experienced its last RF-101C loss when Nick Pishvanov was hit by gunfire over Laos, leading to the loss of 56-0212.  Pishvanov ejected and was soon rescued by a CH-3 “Jolly Green Giant” rescue helicopter.  Now vulnerable to the MiG-21 with the ALQ-71 pods and to the SA-2 without them, there was no recourse left but to withdraw the RF-101C from major combat operations over North Vietnam. 

Closest in this row of 20^th TRS Voodoos is the first one lost to the MiG-21, 56-0180.  Maj. Bob Bagley was shot down near Son La, North Vietnam by an AA-2 “Atoll” missile fired by Nguyen Ngoc Do on 16 September 1967.  Nguyen was flying MiG-21F-13 “4420” during the mission, an early “Fishbed-C” aircraft. NARA via Mark Nankivil.

MiG-21PF “Fishbed-D” interceptor with underwing AA-2 “Atoll” missile. USAF.

As a postscript, the RF-101 would soon be evaluated against the same aircraft that had recently demonstrated success against the Voodoo, a captured MiG-21F-13 in Nevada, given the code name “Have Doughnut.”  Provided to the USAF by the Israeli government after their intelligence services had arranged with an Iraqi pilot to defect with his aircraft, the Fishbed-C was evaluated against a variety of USAF and U.S. Navy aircraft beginning in February 1968 within the restricted airspace of the Nevada Test Site.  The sole evaluation of the MiG-21 against a “clean” 363^rd TRW RF-101 at 15,000 feet took place during a 40 minute flight on 15 March 1968.   Acceleration was compared between the two aircraft at both military and maximum power, yielding basically equal results.  During the two simulated engagements that followed, the MiG-21 was able to keep up with and track the Voodoo through its break turn and maneuvers during diving flight.  The MiG-21 experienced significant buffet at 530 knots indicated airspeed and was unable to accelerate further while the RF-101 continued to accelerate away to reach a speed of 650 knots.  The results of the test flight indicated that the best defensive maneuver for the RF-101 when engaged by a MiG-21 was a straight unloaded acceleration with minimum maneuvering to defeat an “Atoll” missile launch and separate at minimum altitude.  A steep descent of 45-degree dive angle would not only take advantage of ground clutter against the infrared seeker head of the “Atoll,” but due to the high stick forces and poor pitch rate of the MiG-21 at speeds above 500 KIAS at these relatively low altitudes, the MiG pilot would have to be worried about ground impact.  An earlier evaluation flight against an F-105D equipped with the same APR-25 RWR carried by the RF-101C showed that it was vulnerable to the X-band SRD-5MK “High Fix” radar of the MiG-21F-13 and would not detect the radar until the MiG was within launch range of the “Atoll” missile at an average distance of 1.9 nautical miles and could not detect it at all past 2.7 nautical miles. 

Soon afterwards, an RF-4C was evaluated against the MiG-21.  Unlike the Voodoo, the reconnaissance Phantom enjoyed a significant acceleration advantage over the Fishbed-C at altitudes below 30,000 feet, particularly at military power, giving the Phantom a wider set of escape options from pursuing MiGs.  The Phantom could carry its ECM equipment with a reduced drag penalty and, unlike the Voodoo, could also carry a QRC-353A chaff dispenser which proved effective in breaking radar lock of the MiG-21’s “High Fix” ranging radar.  Also, having two sets of eyes in the Phantom was beneficial in picking up the very small visual profile of the MiG-21 given the inability of the APR-25 RWR to give effective warning.  While the results proved that the Voodoo could survive against the MiG-21 under favorable conditions, flight evaluation had shown that the RF-4C was significantly more survivable in the threat environment over North Vietnam.  The decision to withdraw the Voodoo from combat operations over most of North Vietnam had been clearly justified, and would not be reversed.  However, events would prove that no matter how old and worn the proud warhorse was becoming, the Voodoo was anything but “being put out to pasture.”