Lies and Damned Lies! (Followed by Statistics): Night Fighter Ops in the Korean War

While conducting research for a new book on early USAF interceptor development, I wanted to find out about the combat record of F-94s, the first to be equipped with the new Hughes E-series fire control systems that provided the foundation for at least three generations of successful Air Force interceptors.  I was also curious to compare the F-94 with its contemporaries that were also sent into combat over Korea, most notably the Douglas F3D-2 Skyknight.  What I read from recent, highly reputable sources shocked me and, initially, did not pass the "smell test". The first was this little gem from Air & Space Magazine: "Originally assigned to fly B-29 escort missions every other night, taking turns with U.S. Air Force night fighters, the Marines were soon flying nightly, at the insistence of the Air Force general in charge of B-29 operations, who specified the F3Ds for the job...although the Lockheed jet, like the Skyknight, had a second seater, what it didn't have was the F3D's radar system--or its firepower."  Hmmmm.  I have a very well-worn copy of the official USAF history of the Korean War, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 by one of the Air Force's most respected historians, Robert F. Futrell.  I sure didn't see anything like that, and from my knowledge of Hughes fire control systems the foregoing made no sense to me.

So, I started digging deeper and found this screamer in an otherwise outstanding book on fighter design, development, operations, and conceptual evolution: "At first, B-29 escort was an every-other-night assignment, alternating with Air Force F-94s.  The F-94 apparently did not impress, because the general responsible for the bomber group eventually insisted that only F3Ds be used for escort."  Putting it as politely and graciously as I can, the latter claim appeared to be completely unsubstantiated.  I've been around enough sailors growing up to be able to recognize a particular type of "sea story" where the plucky old Navy prevails and comes off smelling like a dainty little rose.  I deeply respect the Navy, and come from an Air Force family.  But I served in the Army and we have a suitably eloquent response to such stories: I call "Bullshit!"  So, using available resources I decided to investigate the question on my own.  Those who served before me deserve nothing less than to make sure that the record is accurate.  Now, maybe I am missing something, but this is what I have, detailed below.

Combat experience against Soviet-flown Mikoyan MiG-15 fighters had shown the utter vulnerability of the Boeing B-29 Superfortress during daylight bombing operations, even with protective screens of escort fighters including the best American fighter aircraft, the North American F-86 Sabre.  After a bloody mission over Sinuiju on 12 April 1951 and the infamous "Black Tuesday" on 23 October of the same year, the rapidly increasing loss rate of B-29s venturing into "MiG Alley" where the industrial heart of communist North Korea was located demanded that the old Superfortress bombers switch over to night missions.  The following months were relatively quiet as the emphasis of B-29 missions changed to tactical support of beleaguered United Nations units fending off over fifty divisions of Red Chinese troops pouring into the Korean peninsula.  As the tide turned over the course of 1952 and the fighting turned into a slow, bloody stalemate along the 38th Parallel, B-29s once again ranged north to cut supply routes connecting Red China and North Korea across the Yalu River and destroy critical enemy infrastructure.  At first, the primary threat against the American bombers was flak directed by radar-controlled searchlights, hearkening back to the night raids over Europe during World War Two.  However, the searchlights were soon used to illuminate the targets for waiting MiG-15s as the long, drawn-out bomber streams were tracked on Communist radar and the MiGs vectored in behind each bomber as they approached their target individually, the B-29s predictably spaced three minutes apart over the same target and following the invisible arcs created by SHORAN navigational beacons.  The effects were rudely demonstrated on 10 June 1952 during a raid over Kwaksan when two of four B-29s conducting the raid were shot down my MiGs after being "coned" by searchlights while a third aircraft was heavily damaged and had to divert for an emergency landing in South Korea.

Experiments using F-84G day fighters under friendly GCI control during August and September of 1952 proved very ineffective, while ECM equipment provided mixed results jamming the ground radars that directed the searchlights.  Meanwhile, Fifth Air Force, in charge of all tactical support aircraft in theater, had since June been considering using night fighters to provide better protection of both B-29 medium bombers and B-26 light bombers during their missions over North Korea.  At the time, there were two squadrons of night fighters based in Korea, VMF(N)-513 of the Marine Corps, equipped with 12 World War Two-era Grumman F7F-3N piston-engine aircraft and the 319th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, equipped with the newer Lockheed F-94B Starfire, with 25 aircraft on strength, at least on paper.  The latter was an interim interceptor aircraft, designed for night and all-weather air defense of North America, and its limitations were well known as it stood in the gap pending delivery of the long-delayed F-89 and F-86D interceptors.  At its heart was the advanced Hughes E-1 fire control system.  Incorporating a 50-kilowatt AN/APG-33 radar system with an 18-inch diameter antenna, the radar could not only perform both search and automatic tracking functions, but once it was locked on the the target the "black boxes" composing the E-1 system provided steering cues and closure rate to the pilot, indicated when within firing range, and provided a breakaway indication at 200 yards range to permit successful interception without even being able to see the target.  As a backup, the F-94B was also equipped with a conventional gun sight.  Contemporary interceptors could detect the target and follow the "blip" to fall in trail behind it, but had to visually sight the target through the gun sight before engaging it.  The process was not automated as it was in the F-94B.  The Hughes system also allowed other, more advanced intercept geometries such as the "collision course" approach then under development and intended for use with rockets.  This was not possible with existing technology, and the Hughes E-1 system would be a windfall for the Communists to develop advanced all-weather interceptors of their own if it ever fell into enemy hands.

Fearing the compromise of the revolutionary technology of the Hughes E-1 fire control system, since its full introduction to Korea in March 1952 the F-94B had been restricted from areas north of the designated bomb line against North Korean targets.  Instead, the Starfires concentrated on "heckler" attacks by slow, primitive, and effective Polikarpov PO-2 "Mule" biplanes conducting night harassment raids in the rear of UN lines.  In this late summer of 1952, this order still stood in place.  That left only the Marines' twelve F7F-3N Tigercats available to provide night fighter support for the B-29s.  Beginning in June 1952, the "Flying Nightmares" of VMF(N)-513 began providing four planes every night to support Bomber Command missions.  Supporting both B-29 medium bombers and Douglas B-26 light bombers, standard procedure was for the Marine night fighters to arrive five minutes ahead of the bombers and then patrol the 20-25 miles between the initial point (IP) where the bomb run would begin and the target, covering the bombers when they were most vulnerable and unable to take any evasive action.  Although they did contribute to the success of a B-26 mission over the sleepy northeastern coast of North Korea in September 1952, the Grumman Tigercat night fighters proved to be nearly worthless due to limited performance and obsolescent radar technology.  Help was soon on the way for the Marines of VMF(N)-513.

During the early fall of 1952, the "Flying Nightmares" began to transition into the Navy's new jet night fighter, the Douglas F3D-2 Skyknight, known to the Navy as "Willie the Whale" for its large size and lack of engine power.  After limited deployment of four-ship detachments on Navy carriers, the F3D was soon relegated to shore-based duty with Marine aviation units.  The dimensions of the new night fighter were determined by its Westinghouse radar system.  Intended to provide a search range of up to 125 nautical miles against medium bomber-sized targets as well as tail warning of incoming fighters, the Westinghouse AN/APQ-35 radar system was in turn composed of three individual radar systems; the AN/APS-21 search radar with its large 30-inch diameter antenna, the small AN/APG-26 tracking radar positioned in front of the search antenna used to generate target range and firing solutions for the night fighter, as well as a seperate AN/APS-28 tail warning radar with a maximum range of three miles to warn of enemy fighters closing on the tail for a firing pass.  With a peak power output of 200 kilowatts and the large search antenna offering excellent angular resolution, the APQ-35 radar system of the F3D-2 could detect a fighter-sized target out to a range of about 17 nautical miles, far short of the original specification but excellent performance for the day.  Tracking range of the 8-inch diameter, 50-kilowatt APG-26 was limited to a maximum range of 4,000 yards, but could not provide a firing solution until within 2,000 yards or 1 nautical mile.  Given two crew members and two separate radar systems, the F3D had a rudimentary track-while-scan system that often proved useful in the hands of an experienced crew.  However, these capabilities came at the cost of a huge weight penalty and greatly increased aerodynamic drag due to the large frontal area needed to accommodate the radar equipment.  Underpowered due to the failure of the more powerful Westinghouse J46 engine, the F3D-2 had to make do with a pair of Westinghouse J34-WE-36 turbojets, laboring to produce 6,800 pounds of thrust against a combat weight of 21,374 pounds and a maximum load factor of 5.5 G.  The maximum rate of climb at combat weight for the F3D-2 was an anemic 3,570 feet-per-minute at sea level to a combat ceiling of 35,500 feet.  The F3D-2 had a maximum speed of 458 knots at sea level.  In its favor, the F3D-2 had the potent standard Navy armament of four 20-millimeter cannon, married to a MK 20 Mod 0 gun sight and a combat radius of 520 nautical miles.

In comparison, the Lockheed F-94 was built as an interceptor rather than a night fighter.  For the interception mission, speed, rate-of-climb, and combat ceiling are paramount.  Conceived as an interim interceptor design to provide the USAF a night and all-weather intercept capability at the earliest date, Lockheed essentially married the new Hughes E-1 fire control system for the Northrop F-89 Scorpion to the best performing two-seat aircraft in the USAF inventory, the TF-80C (later better known as the T-33).  Adding an afterburner to the basic Allison J33 engine for better climb and altitude performance along with other minor improvements yielded the original F-94A.  While the E-1 system possessed advanced capabilities, the relatively small 18-inch diameter antenna and 50-kilowatt power output imposed performance restrictions on the AN/APG-33 radar.  During tests, the APG-33 radar demonstrated a maximum search range of 10 nautical miles against a B-25 target, however, the scope display went out to 30,000 yards or 15 nautical miles.  Tracking range was about the same as for the F3D, with the range display graduated on the attack display out to 2,000 yards.  Despite the awkward radome spoiling the fine lines of its F-80 predecessor, it faired cleanly into the nose structure to produce a minimal drag penalty for the F-94.  The F-94B that was deployed to Korea benefited from all-weather landing systems, improved avionics and a somewhat more reliable J33-A-33A afterburning engine that produced a maximum of 6,000 pounds thrust against a combat weight of 13,474 pounds, an extremely modest thrust loading by today's standards but respectable for the early 1950s and far better than the numbers for the F3D-2.  For an area intercept mission, the F-94B had a combat ceiling of 45,700 feet, a maximum rate of climb of 7,800 feet per minute, and a maximum speed 511 knots at sea level using afterburner.  Given the small airframe and thirsty engine, the F-94B had a relatively limited combat radius of 288 nautical miles.

In late 1952, the Soviet Union was preparing to introduce its first jet night fighter after six-and-a-half years of design effort and four years of flight test development.  Experiencing many false starts and severe developmental hurdles, Soviet planners had settled on the one system that worked, married to the one proven fighter available with the RP-1 Izumrud ("Emerald") radar system, tested on a modified MiG-15 and accepted for service with the brand-new MiG-17 as the MiG-17P "Fresco-B" interceptor.  An evolutionary development of the MiG-15, the early MiG-17 possessed somewhat higher speed but still made do with the non-afterburning VK-1 engine of the late-model MiG-15bis.  Most of the Soviet effort had been focused on a radar system similar in concept to the early Hughes E-series systems, the Toriy  ("Thorium") radar.  Intended for both single and dual-place interceptors, the Toriy used a single antenna to conduct both search and tracking functions, and as with the Hughes radars was to have an auto-track function once the radar was locked on its target.  The Toriy failed to pass its State trials during early 1952 and a subsequent design, the Korshun ("Kite") was also a failure.  This left the RP-1 Izumrud, developed as a back-up system, as the primary airborne intercept radar for first-generation Soviet night fighters.  Like the AN/APQ-35 system of the Douglas Skyknight, search and tracking functions were divided between two separate antennas, although in the case of the RP-1 system they were much smaller, scaled to fit a small MiG-15 sized fighter.  The tracking antenna was contained in a small bullet fairing centered within the engine inlet while the larger rectangular antenna of the search radar was faired into the nose fuselage above the inlet duct.  Against a B-29 sized target, the RP-1 Izumrud, given the NATO code name "Scan Fix," had a search range of about 6 nautical miles and a tracking range of 1 nautical mile.  Many more experimental radar systems would follow over the course of the 1950s, but until the appearance of the TsD-30 "High Fix" radar in 1959 with the Sukhoi Su-9 "Fishpot" interceptor, the primitive dual-antenna Izumrud would remain the standard radar system for high-performance Soviet interceptors (even then, "High Fix" had very limited capabilities compared to contemporary Western fighter radars).  This background is relevant as it provides context for the decision to allow the Marine F3D night fighters to operate over North Korea while the restriction on the E-1 equipped F-94B remained in place.  In retrospect, exploitation of a captured Hughes E-1 system could have drastically changed the Soviet's developmental trajectory for interceptor radars during the critical decade of the 1950s.  The older technology represented by the Westinghouse AN/APQ-35 system would have done relatively little to aid Soviet efforts, so the F3D-2 interceptors carrying them were allowed to range over North Korea right up to the Yalu River.

Having completed the transition to the F3D-2 by the beginning of November 1952, the Marine aviators of VMF(N)-513 soon enjoyed great success with their new mounts, due in no small part to their naturally aggressive spirit.  On 2 November 1952, a Marine Skyknight claimed its first victory during an escort mission over Sinuiju when GCI from Chodo Island positioned an F3D behind a Communist jet.  The Marines closed in and, based on the exhaust pattern, identified the Red fighter as a Yak-15, peering through the gun sight and opening fire.  As it turned out, Russian records have shown that the aircraft was a MiG-15, not a Yakovlev fighter, which was never deployed to Korea.  The same records also show that the tough MiG survived the attack and managed to return to base.  A second MiG-15 was not so lucky during the evening of 8 November when another Skyknight crew downed a MiG-15 northwest of Sonchon.  At that time, standard procedure for was to provide barrier cover to the drawn-out B-29 bomber streams by taking a position 20 to 50 miles north of the target under GCI control.  As the month of November drew on, Brigadier General Fisher, commanding general of FEAF Bomber Command, noted that the Marine Skyknights provided "some small degree of success."  Meanwhile, frustrated USAF Starfire crews busied themselves with the dangerously mundane task of using the most technologically advanced aircraft in theater to pursue low, slow biplane intruders made with fabric and wire.

The situation changed in November 1952 when the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Vandenberg, was conducting a personal tour of units in the Korea theater.  Upon hearing about continuing harassment of Bomber Command aircraft by MiGs and the gross misuse of the F-94s of the 319th FIS, General Vandenburg immediately ordered that the Starfires be allowed to conduct missions north of the bomb line between the Yalu River and Chongehon River.  Areas directly along the Yalu River were still deemed too sensitive for the F-94B, but the F-94s began to take the fight up north, used to support missions by Douglas B-26 Invader light bombers while the Marine F3D-2 night fighters continued with the B-29 support mission.  This arrangement would continue for the next two months through late January 1953.  During that interval, four Bomber Command B-29s would be shot down by MiG-15s and many more badly damaged, along with one more special missions B-29 conducting a night leaflet drop while attached to the 91st Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron, which would not have merited an escort of scarce night fighters.  While the Marines earned their hard-won recognition and eventual fame for four MiG kills through the end of January 1953, the historical record shows that it should be tempered by the loss of four B-29 Superfortresses during their watch.  Over the preceding months, the F3D barrier patrols allowed enough MiGs to leak through to conduct 23 firing passes against B-29 formations with their heavy cannon armament, according to Bomber Command's statistics.  By late January, Brig. Gen. Fisher seriously considered withdrawing the B-29 from combat operations over North Korea due to increasing losses, but more advanced B-50, B-47 and B-36 bombers were simply not available, being fully committed to the expanding Strategic Air Command deterrent force.  Improved tactics and timing for the SHORAN-guided B-29 streams could improve the situation, but the fighter support piece had to be addressed, urgently.

A 27 January 1953 meeting at Fifth Air Force headquarters yielded a new plan for improved utilization and coordination of night fighters and resulting joint procedures to better support Bomber Command objectives.  Taking inventory of available mission assets, the GCI station at Chodo Island was limited to controlling four interceptors at a time.  Available night fighter forces were 12 F3D-2 Skyknights of VMF(N)-513 and (at least on paper) 25 F-94B Starfires of the 319th FIS.  Both aircraft, perhaps more notably the F-94, suffered from severe maintenance headaches.  On any given night, the 319th could only manage an 80-percent in-commission rate with an average of five aircraft down for maintenance.  This situation was further exacerbated by a critical USAF shortage of what was still the primary all-weather interceptor defending North American territory as the F-89 and F-86D programs continued to drag on and the newly introduced F-94C Starfire was experiencing the usual teething problems.  While the Marine Air Wing commander requested twelve more "highly effective" F3D-2 night fighters from CINC Pacific Fleet, his request was politely rejected on grounds that the bomber support mission was primarily a USAF responsibility as well as questionable resources to maintain a second squadron of temperamental jet night fighters in theater.  The respective night fighters of each service were assigned different roles.  One great advantage of the F3D-2 was that its Westinghouse AN/APQ-35 radar could detect the identification (IFF) signals of friendly B-29 bombers, making it easy for them to keep close tabs on their charges so the Marines were assigned the close escort mission.

The Marine F3Ds had already adjusted tactics by that point in January 1953 in response to a Bomber Command request for better overhead cover of its bomber streams.  Under the new tactical concept, the F3Ds would position themselves 2,000 to 3,000 feet overhead of the bombers at the initial point (IP) where the B-29s would begin their bomb run and follow the bomber stream through the target and to their breakaway point.  If a bomber was "coned" by searchlights, the F3Ds would fall into position to cover its tail and engage MiGs as they moved into firing position.  Within the next few days left in January 1953, this would lead to two more MiG-15 kills by Marine Skyknight crews to bring their cumulative total to four.  Meanwhile, the Air Force F-94Bs would be assigned to provide barrier counter-air patrols between the MiG bases and bombers, positioned about 30 miles from the target.  Kills by Air Force F-94 crews would also be forthcoming.  During subsequent night fighter support missions, four to six F-94s would be assigned to the barrier patrol mission on any given night under GCI direction from Chodo Island while nine F3Ds (including two spares) would provide close escort for the Superfortresses, most using either "racetrack" or "pacer" tactics alongside the bomber stream while one or two more Skyknights would provide overhead patrols over the target.  Both sets of night fighters were required to check in with the Tactical Air Direction Center (TADC) 20 minutes prior to the bombers' time over target to be vectored towards any detected airborne threats.

Once these and Brigadier General Fisher's tactical changes to reduce the vulnerability of the B-29s were implemented, mission success improved and the B-29 loss of 28 January 1953 would prove to be the final combat loss of a Superfortress over Korea.  A switch back to occasional nighttime tactical support missions as UN forces fought to gain ground while armistice negotiations were under way was also a contributing factor to the decreased loss rate.  As the winter of early 1953 wore on, the commander of the 319th FIS voiced his frustration that the MiGs would not come up to engage his barrier patrols, but their presence coupled with the close protection of Marine F3D crews served as an effective deterrent to Communist MiGs and improved the flagging morale of the B-29 crews.  In early May 1953, B-29 targets began to shift once again towards lines of communication across the Yalu River and logistical targets on the Korean side of the Chinese border as Red forces tried to rush in supplies and equipment in advance of the impending armistice.  Due to the risk of an aircraft being captured by Chinese forces and quickly spirited away before the wreckage could be located and destroyed, target areas immediately adjacent to the Yalu River remained off-limits to the F-94.  Therefore, in the latter weeks of the Korean War VMF(N)-513 would assume barrier patrol duties in addition to close escort of the B-29s as they struck an increasing number of targets along the Yalu.  In the meantime, both units continued to fend off North Korean "Bedcheck Charlie" harassment missions.  The PO-2 biplanes often proved difficult to find within the "ground clutter" experienced by fighter radars at low altitude.  During the spring of 1953 the 319th FIS scored three more kills, including two MiG-15s.  Unfortunately, two F-94Bs were lost during the same period, one due to stalling out at low altitude after shooting down a PO-2 and the second after colliding with another of the low, slow intruders.  A total of 28 F-94B aircraft were lost in the Korean theater, mostly due to operational causes.  Two were lost during combat operations and none to enemy action.  The F-94B crews of the 319th FIS can also remain justifiably proud that no B-29s were lost while they were on duty.

The Marines of the VMF(N)-513 "Flying Nightmares" have earned a place in history as the first unit to make a night kill of a MiG-15 and to have achieved more MiG kills than any other night fighter.  With regard to the Air Force F-94s, the limitations of the aircraft had been acknowledged from the start, yet the record shows that it performed admirably.  In the final analysis, it is difficult to prove the effectiveness of night fighter operations because of what didn't happen, since Western historians have not had the benefit of knowing specific details of enemy planning, intentions, and operations against B-29 incursions.  Nonetheless, the facts do exist for what did happen, and when.  There was no need for Air Force historians such as Robert Futrell or anyone else to burnish the image of the Starfire into a gross historical distortion and grasp after unearned glory.  It would seem to me that some modern historians have done this, perhaps unintentionally, on behalf of their own service interests of Navy and Marine aircraft and units, and have done so at the expense of brave Air Force crews performing a miserable and thankless job during a now forgotten war.  Some of their number are still with us, and they deserve better.  This has been my attempt to give them their due by fleshing out the history and examining it all within a broader context.  The conclusions that I have drawn as a result are quite different and, I would say, better corroborated by available historical evidence.

Selected references:

Futrell, Robert F., The United States Air Force in Korea: 1950-1953, New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961.

Futrell, Robert F., United States Air Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 July 1952-27 July 1953, USAF Historical Study No. 127, USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 1 July 1956.

Dorr, Robert F., B-29 Superfortress Units of the Korean War, Osprey Combat Aircraft 42, Botley, Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2003.

Standard Aircraft Characteristics, F-94B, 24 March 1952.

Standard Aircraft Characteristics, F3D-2 "Skyknight," 15 February 1952.

Radar Set, AN/APQ-35, -35A, MIL-HDBK-162A, 15 December 1965.

Buttler, Tony and Gordon, Yefim, Soviet Secret Projects: Fighters Since 1945, Hinckley, England: Midland Publishing, 2005.

Reviews so far for "The F-101 Voodoo: An Illustrated History of McDonnell's Heavyweight Fighter"

So far, I am very gratified that the reviews of my recent book have been generally very positive. The process has been very educational so far.  It has been one thing for me to write reviews in the past but receiving them for one's own work has given me an entirely new perspective.  Current reviews as posted on Amazon can be seen here for your perusal: http://www.amazon.com/The-F-101-Voodoo-Illustrated-Heavyweight/dp/0764347993  I do very much appreciate both the time and thought of those who have left substantive reviews.

I am open to criticism.  In writing as in all other matters, criticism allows a realistic assessment of the strengths as well as weaknesses of one's efforts. I knew moving forward that this book would be an imperfect effort.  It is just the nature of things.  One reviewer has called my book a "missed opportunity" and I found his points to be salient. at least with regard to coverage of the operational use of the F-101B. The narrative presented in the book draws heavily from official USAF histories and unfortunately, by the time I was ready to submit the manuscript for the book, I had not found much on the F-101B.  What I had found and digested with regard to the Voodoo overall was fascinating.  However, there are works such as Nigel Walpole's outstanding book, Voodoo Warriors (now available as an e-Book: http://www.amazon.com/Voodoo-Warriors-Story-McDonnell-Fast-jets-ebook/dp/B00HZNOT1Q/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1433717735&sr=1-1&keywords=nigel+walpole+Voodoo+warriors), that cover those histories in great detail from first-hand sources.  I saw no need to duplicate an existing work and even if I had, it would have not come close to the quality and depth of a work that has already been published.  However, I had dug up a very considerable amount of material on the development and evolution of the F-101B as a weapon system.  Most of this documentation has never been published and much only recently declassified.  I would say that for the stated purpose of the book, as given in the introduction explaining that the present work is primarily a developmental history, much important historical material has been added to the discussion.

With regard to the RF-101, there was some risk of duplication with another recent, excellent work, Doug Gordon's book on tactical reconnaissance which may be found here: http://www.amazon.com/Tactical-Reconnaissance-Cold-Doug-Gordon-ebook/dp/B00L6Z9DYW/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1433718161&sr=1-1&keywords=doug+gordon+tactical+reconnaissance.  However, in the course of my research I found much to add, particularly with regard to development and especially details of tactical employment of the RF-101C.  Again, much of this had been classified when the last major works on the Voodoo were written in the mid-to-late 1980s, and has never been presented to a general audience.  I made an attempt to look at everything within the broad historical context of the Cold War and critically examine the place of the Voodoo within it.  While the interceptors may have been more numerous, the RF-101 was critically important as the eyes of the United States during the most dangerous years of the Cold War.  I also wanted to look at its combat service within a broader context and present it as a fleshed out, detailed narrative.  The reviewer in question found this approach "esoteric."  As a combat veteran myself, albeit of a different branch of service in a different war, I disagree.  The story of those who flew into harm's way, and especially those who did not make it back, is the only one worth telling if one wants to prioritize and single out one aspect of the story.  Fortunately, based on initial feedback from some who flew and maintained the RF-101C during its years of service over Indochina, my efforts have been appreciated and one notable member of that fraternity has also posted a review.

In my defense, I did not miss the opportunity to tell the full story of the concept and development of the "strategic fighter," and the tortuous evolution of the Voodoo's roles and missions right up through the eve of its entry into service.  Flight testing and the developmental problems experienced have not only been covered in unprecedented detail, but within a broad context as well.  I tried to cover the existing gaps in the story of the Voodoo, and these were among the most glaring ones that were missing in telling the story of the airplane and making any sense at all of its history.  I have related the broad strokes in a previous post: http://fighterwriter101.blogspot.com/2015/02/black-magic-unknown-history-of-voodoo.html  The story related in the book is far more detailed and again, mostly unknown.

Further feedback and reviews, good, bad, or indifferent, are always welcome here or elsewhere so long as they are fair.  Thank you for reading!