Selected North Vietnamese pilots had begun training in China
to operate MiG-15s and MiG-17s in 1960.
By the end of 1962 this contingent received 36 MiG-17F “Fresco-C”
fighters to form the first fighter squadron of the Vietnam People’s Air Force
(VPAF), the 921st Fighter Regiment, but both the unit and its
aircraft remained in China. In the
aftermath of the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the 921st Fighter Regiment was recalled from China and
arrived at Noi Bai airport (known to the Americans as Phuc Yen) near Hanoi on 6
August 1964. In April 1965, North
Vietnamese MiG-17s made their first kills of the war when two
MiG-17Fs of the 921st Fighter Regiment shot down two F-105Ds of the 355th TFW near Thanh
Hoa. Maj. F. E. Bennett and Capt. J. A. Magnuson were killed in action. The threat of MiGs had appeared, but then
seemed to fade afterwards. Of greater
concern to mission planners was new imagery of two SA-2 “Guideline” surface-to-air missile sites under
construction. Concerned about the MiG
threat, in June 1965 CINCPAC in Hawai’i ordered daily photo coverage of all
jet-capable airfields in North Vietnam above 20-degrees North latitude. Green Python RF-101Cs from Udorn RTAFB covered the requirement on
odd days, Navy RF-8As on even days.
Effective 7 September 1965, the VPAF formed a second fighter squadron,
the 923rd Regiment, equipped with MiG-17s. By this time, the 921st had
begun conversion to the MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C” and operated both types. On 18 September 1965, the Americans
discovered eight MiG fighters photographed at a new base at Kep Airfield, 35
nautical miles northeast of Hanoi, along with 24 shipping crates at Phuc
Yen. Soon, US intelligence analysts
noted that the North Vietnamese were demonstrating proficiency in GCI control
of MiGs. By early November, CINCPAC
expressed concern that MiGs might present a greater threat to recon aircraft. 2nd Air Division assured CINCPAC that the speed and
maneuverability of the RF-101C would be sufficient defense against MiG-15 and MiG-17 interceptors.
|
VPAF pilots of the 923rd Fighter
Regiment on the flight line with their new MiG-17F “Fresco-C” interceptors. USAF. |
The MiGs were the newest threat, but others remained more
concerning. While anti-aircraft guns remained the deadliest component of North
Vietnamese air defenses, planners continued to cast a wary eye on the
increasing numbers of SA-2 sites being discovered in North Vietnam,
especially after the brief and unsuccessful introduction of the QRC-160 ECM pod in the spring of 1965. Throughout the course of May 1965, U-2 aircraft monitored the emplacement of more
sites surrounding Hanoi. RF-101Cs could not provide detailed photography of the
sites due to the 40 nautical mile range restriction around Haiphong and the MiG
base at Phuc Yen. It had been noticed
that MiGs would not be scrambled against targets outside of the 40-mile radius.
|
Engagement envelopes of guns and surface to air
missiles encountered during the conflict in Indochina. USAF. |
The North Vietnamese MiGs tangled with the Voodoo for the
first time on 12 October 1965. A pair of
RF-101s conducting a mission near Yen Bai, 30 miles northwest of Hanoi,
reported taking cannon fire from a pair of MiG-17s,
but received no damage. A month later,
on 15 November 1965, two 15th TRS
RF-101Cs were flying at 9,000 feet photographing an
objective at Yen Bai when they encountered a pair of MiGs passing behind them
at 15,000 feet, setting up in a high left perch, and then diving right to open
fire on the wingman. After completing
his photo run, the lead RF-101Cs egressed at maximum speed toward friendly
territory. Meanwhile, the wingman descended
to 500 feet AGL and maximum speed, transiting Yen Bai at 100 feet. The MiG-17s,
flying into the face of ferocious anti-aircraft fire directed toward the
Voodoos from a significant portion of the 200 AAA pieces at Yen Bai, broke off
their attack and the second RF-101s successfully returned to Udorn after the
pilot flew into a fog-filled valley and used the tremendous power of his Voodoo
to execute a rapid climb to 44,000 feet.
On 26 November, two more Voodoos conducting a mission north of Yen Bai
were engaged by four MiG-17s diving at them and opening fire with their
cannons from a range of 4,000 feet. The
RF-101s broke left and dived down to 200 feet, losing sight of the MiGs and
returning home. Within a month, the new
MiG-21s of the 921st regiment were known to be active. At about the same time, the VPAF received the
first of ten radar-equipped MiG-17PF “Fresco-D” interceptors. In late January 1966 the 921st Fighter Regiment began introduction of the
MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C”, taking part in combat missions
the following month alongside the more numerous MiG-17. A number of MiG sightings occurred in
February and March 1966, the most notable of which concerned a mission near the
Chinese border on 12 February 1966. A
pair of RF-101s had completed a reconnaissance run over an objective in North
Vietnam at 40,000 feet when they had apparently strayed inside of Chinese
airspace to a point about 5 miles west of where the Tengtiao River crosses the
border with North Vietnam. Two incoming
bogeys were sighted on a southerly heading toward them, but abruptly turned
west at the time of the sighting. No
positive identification could be made but they were apparently inbound Chinese
MiGs. The Voodoo experienced another
reported encounter with MiGs over North Vietnam on 17 March 1966. Two RF-101Cs piloted by Major Hallet P. Marston and Captain Richard M. Cooper were near their objective in the vicinity of
Dien Bien Phu when they were engaged by MiG-17s,
which made four firing passes. Dense
haze allowed RF-101s to evade further visual contact, engage afterburner and
escape, easily outdistancing the pursuing MiGs.
|
Commander of the VPAF 921st Fighter
Regiment, Major Tran Hanh, in the cockpit of a MiG-21PFM “Fishbed-F” ca. 1970. The 921st was the first North
Vietnamese unit to field the MiG-21 beginning in April 1966. USAF. |
|
MiG-21PF
“Fishbed-D” interceptor of VPAF. Lacking the cannons and maneuverability of the MiG-17, the MiG-21 had Mach 2 speed and
carried either 57-mm rocket pods or AA-2 “Atoll” IR-guided missiles. USAF.
|
On 23 April 1966, MiG-21s engaged American fighters for the first time
with no success. By this time the VPAF received its first MiG-21PF “Fishbed-D” interceptors. Over the course of the spring of 1966,
numerous problems with the R-3S (NATO: AA-2 “Atoll”)
missiles and inexperience with the relatively complex fire control system of
the MiG-21 resulted in very limited combat
effectiveness. While the initial
MiG-21F-13 aircraft were each armed with a single
30-millimeter cannon, the newer MiG-21PF with its much more capable RP-21 radar had no
internal cannon and relied solely upon either “Atoll”
missiles or 57-millimeter rocket pods.
The North Vietnamese pilots were also required to work within overly
strict and inflexible tactical guidelines.
In the case of the MiG-21 pilots, the tactical maneuvers that worked
well for the agile MiG-17 proved far less suited to the MiG-21. With the introduction of the MiG-21, both MiG
types underwent a division of labor in which the MiG-21s would engage targets above 8,000 feet, and the
MiG-17s anything below 5,000 feet. Any aircraft in the intermediate zone could
be engaged by either type. However, the
SA-2 surface-to-air missile remained the primary
defensive weapon.
The reintroduction of ECM pods and changes in tactics to avoid gunfire
in the latter half of 1966 caused a change in MiG activity. To avoid the far more numerous small-caliber
AAA weapons, USAF strike aircraft started flying their missions above a minimum
altitude of 6,500 feet. Beginning in the
early fall, F-105 units reintroduced improved ECM pods that proved highly effective against both
missiles and the fire control radars of the larger-caliber AAA guns. However, the pods had the disadvantage of
highlighting the positions of strike packages on the scopes of North Vietnamese
GCI operators, who could triangulate on the American strike aircraft and vector
MiGs to those positions. As a result,
VPAF MiG pilots became distinctly more active and aggressive toward the end of
1966.
|
RF-101C-65-MC 56-0083 of the 45th TRS
departing in afterburner, ca. 1966. The first aircraft in Southeast Asia to carry camouflage, the original all-black tail
markings have been modified with the serial number now in white. This aircraft carries both nose and tail
antennas for the AN/APR-25 RWR system. NARA via Mark Nankivil. |
On New Year’s Day 1967, two RF-101Cs photographing objectives southwest of Hanoi
received an electronic indication of approaching MiGs. Along with much of the fleet, the Voodoos had
recently been modified with AN/APR-25 radar warning receivers, which showed an
X-Band strobe at their 10 o’clock, moving toward their 9 o’clock position. The contact then settled into their 6 o’clock
at one ring, uncomfortably close. Taking
advantage of dense cloud cover and accelerating to Mach 1.05, the recon aircraft
turned for home and noted the high speed of the pursuing aircraft, which were
able to remain close enough to remain at two rings on the indicator before the
contact broke off pursuit at the Laos border.
The Voodoo pilots could not get a visual identification on the
interceptors but due to their speed believed that they were MiG-21s. However, the next day the North Vietnamese
MiG-21 force was dealt a very severe blow on 2
January 1967, courtesy of Operation Bolo, conceived by the staff of
the legendary former commander of the 81st Tactical Fighter Wing at RAF Bentwaters and
new boss of the 8th TFW “Wolfpack”, Colonel Robin Olds, claiming seven VPAF
MiGs. While the MiG-17s were directed to remain below the cloud deck
over the area, the MiG-21s climbed through to engage what they thought
was another strike force of F-105 Thunderchiefs to meet a buzz saw composed of
waves of hungry F-4C Phantoms that were loaded for bear with
air-to-air missiles. North Vietnamese
MiG-21s would remain out of action for several months
as they reformed their depleted ranks while MiG-17 operations continued at a lower level than had
been the case previously.
|
Colonel Robin Olds, former commander of the 81st
TFW ca. October 1967 as commander of the 8th TFW in Thailand. USAF. |
With the North Vietnamese MiG force at least temporarily out
of commission, the focus of American defensive efforts shifted back to electronic
countermeasures. Much of the effectiveness of the ECM was contingent upon a properly-spaced tactical
formation. The protection afforded by
QRC-160A-1 pods was additive, single aircraft were judged
to remain somewhat vulnerable. Although
the pods produced extra drag, the effect was offset by a net increase in fuel
efficiency due to the reduced need for evasive maneuvering. With the successful test of the improved
QRC-160 equipment after its troublesome introduction
in 1965, medium altitude was opened up once again for USAF tactical
aircraft. After the spectacular success
of the evaluation, the QRC-160A-1 pod was soon given an official designation as
the AN/ALQ-71. However, although its overall reliability was
greatly improved, the ram-air turbine providing power to the electronics proved
prone to failure, disabling the pod.
Also, at ranges closer than 8 to 10 nautical miles from the target
emitter, the jammed radar would begin to “burn through” and render the pod
ineffective. Due to its radiation
pattern, maneuvering flight could negate the pod’s effectiveness.
|
Rear quarter view of the QRC-160A-1
self-protection ECM pod, accepted into service as the AN/ALQ-71. USAF. |
By January 1967, 7th Air Force now had enough ALQ-71 pods available to begin equipping F-4s and
F-105s. For the time being, the RF-101C was not selected to carry the new ECM pod.
The stated reasons were that RF-101s usually flew alone and would refuse
to jam until being tracked by hostile radar.
Therefore, the Navy’s AN/ALQ-51 deception jammer seemed ideal for the Voodoo
as it activated automatically after being triggered by signals from a targeting
radar. The ALQ-51 also had the advantage of being internally
mounted and therefore avoiding the previous drag and wing twisting problems
experienced with the RF-101 when carrying the QRC-160-1 pod in the spring of
1965. The equipment was initially very
effective at countering SA-2 missiles, but during the summer of 1967 RF-101
losses began to mount as North Vietnamese defenses began to rapidly adjust.
7th Air Force therefore directed withdrawing ALQ-51 units from use after less than a year. A new directive was issued to resume two-ship
RF-101C flights, with each aircraft carrying a pair of
ALQ-71 pods under wings. Due to the detrimental effect on the best
defensive qualities of the RF-101, maneuverability and above all speed, it was
directed that the Voodoo aircraft remain away from MiG operating areas, leaving
these target sets to the faster and more capable RF-4C. An alternate tactic allowing some more
flexibility for the RF-101C was to provide fighter escorts carrying the
ALQ-71 pods to provide protection.
Although MiG activity had decreased after Operation Bolo, RF-101s continued to
occasionally encounter MiGs in the early months of 1967. Two weeks after Operation Bolo, on 16 January 1967, an
RF-101C inbound at 22,000 feet to photograph a
secondary target in Laos about 45 nautical miles southwest of Dien Bien Phu received
an X-Band contact on his APR-25 receiver at 1 o’clock, which persisted for
three minutes. He then sighted a silver,
swept wing aircraft at 25,000 feet, setting up for an apparent quartering
head-on attack. The pilot broke his
Voodoo hard left 180 degrees and descended through a thin cloud deck at 12,000
feet at military power and made his way back to Udorn RTAFB. Barely two weeks later, 65 nautical miles
northwest of Hanoi, a pair of RF-101s climbing through 10,000 feet tallied a
pair of MiG-17s orbiting directly overhead. The Voodoos quickly ducked back down to 100
feet AGL to avoid being noticed and continued their mission. On 10 February 1967, another pair of RF-101s
at 21,000 feet operating over northeastern Laos, about 30 miles from the border
with North Vietnam, sighted a MiG on a reciprocal heading at about 35,000 feet
and 10 miles. Heading northwest and
crossing into North Vietnamese airspace to a point east of Dien Bien Phu, the
Voodoos about 15 minutes later sighted an IL-14 “Crate” transport at 4,000 feet, flying out of
Dien Bien Phu. While the RF-101s were
photographing the transport, they noticed an Mi-6 “Hook” heavy transport
helicopter in the same vicinity.
Finally recovered from its mauling at the hands of the
Phantoms of Robin Olds’ 8th TFW
“Wolfpack” to open 1967, the MiG-21s of the 921st Fighter Regiment re-entered the fight during
the spring of that year. Shortly after
Operation Bolo, the VPAF high command
evaluated what had happened and made changes to ensure that such an event would
never happen again. One of the first
adjustments was to change to “hit-and-run” tactics that played to the strengths
of the MiG-21, namely speed, acceleration,
and presentation of a small, fleeting target.
These qualities were tactically integrated with the positive qualities
of the MiG-17, which still formed the
backbone of the VPAF. Attacking MiGs
would work primarily in small groups of two to four aircraft approaching at
varying altitudes. The MiG-21s would be positioned to attack American
aircraft from above with “Atoll” missiles while the MiG-17s would approach from the sides of approaching
strike formations to make the best use of their maneuverability and heavy
cannon armament. The VPAF MiG-21s resumed combat operations on 23 April 1967
with the engagement of USAF F-4Cs. On 29 April, a MiG-21 was sighted by a Voodoo
during a mission over Hoa Loc airfield.
Flying at 15,000 feet, the RF-101 was fired on by an SA-2 when at the same time the pilot noticed the
MiG at 4 o’clock and 6 miles, climbing.
There was no further contact and the Voodoo returned to base. Several days later, on 3 May 1967, the pilots
of a pair of Voodoos conducting a mission in North Vietnam 16 miles ENE of Thai
Nguyen noticed black puffs 25-50 feet from their aircraft, then observed a
single MiG tracking them from their right at 2 miles. There was no further contact with the
MiG. On 22 May, a pair of RF-101s
photographing the Xac Mai motor pool south of Hanoi at 12-14,000 feet observed
the launch of two SA-2 missiles.
At the same time the second missile passed them, the Voodoos began to
take fire from 85-mm AAA. A MiG alert
soon followed, after which the American pilots noticed what appeared to be two
MiG-17s at their 8 o’clock position. After two more SA-2s were fired at them, they
received a MiG call on the Guard frequency just before it cut out due to enemy
jamming. The RF-101s chose to select
afterburner for 3 minutes and egress southwest toward Laos to clear the
mountains, then dropped to low level to ensure that they shook off any pursuing
MiGs.
Due to the improved tactics and increased familiarity with
the MiG-21 and its somewhat cumbersome weapon system, the
MiG-21 saw increased activity through the spring and well into the summer of
1967. On 11 June 1967, an RF-101C on a Blue Tree mission 17 miles southeast of Son La, just
north of the border with Laos, was at 25,000 feet when the pilot noticed a MiG-21
with contrails at 30,000 feet and 5 miles.
When the MiG broke right to dive toward the Voodoo, the pilot dropped
his external tanks and executed a left diving turn to level off at 100 feet
AGL, selected afterburner, and egressed at 620 knots on the deck, picking up an
X-Band strobe on his APR-25 display.
The Voodoo pilot noticed that the MiG appeared to parallel his aircraft
during his descent but was not observed again after crossing a short distance
into Laos. Numerous MiG warnings were
being received that day for 60 miles west to 80 miles northwest of Hanoi. The luck for the intrepid Voodoo crews was
about to run out. On 16 September 1967,
a 20th TRS RF-101C, 56-0180, was shot down by a
MiG-21about 5 miles north of Son La. The Voodoo was flown by Maj. Bob Bagley as part of two-ship formation photographing
the Northwest Railroad. Bagley was captured and became a POW. The following day, another 20th TRS
Voodoo, 56-0181, flown by Capt. Bob Patterson, who had been downed by an
SA-2 less than three months previously, was also
downed by a MiG-21 but fortunately was once again rescued by American
forces. Both aircraft were downed by
MiG-21F-13 “Fishbed-C” fighters assigned to the 921st “Sao
Do” Fighter regiment, using AA-2 Atoll missiles in both cases. Nguyen Ngoc Do claimed Bagley’s aircraft while flying
“4420”, while Pham Thanh Ngan claimed Patterson’s Voodoo in “4520.” The standard configuration for the RF-101C during such a mission would have called for
the carriage of ALQ-71 pods, but these incidents made it clear that
they reduced the speed of the Voodoo to such a degree that the RF-101C could be overtaken by the MiG-21 before the
interceptors would have to break off due to low fuel. These two incidents led 7th Air
Force to prohibit further RF-101C missions over the heavily-defended northern
areas of North Vietnam, but missions over Laos and the North Vietnam panhandle
continued. The 20th TRS
experienced its last RF-101C loss when Nick Pishvanov was hit by gunfire over Laos, leading to the
loss of 56-0212. Pishvanov ejected and was soon rescued by a CH-3 “Jolly
Green Giant” rescue helicopter. Now
vulnerable to the MiG-21 with the ALQ-71 pods and to the SA-2 without them, there was no recourse left but
to withdraw the RF-101C from major combat operations over North
Vietnam.
|
Closest in this row of 20th TRS
Voodoos is the first one lost to the MiG-21, 56-0180. Maj. Bob Bagley was shot down near Son La,
North Vietnam by an AA-2 “Atoll” missile fired by Nguyen Ngoc Do on 16
September 1967. Nguyen was flying
MiG-21F-13 “4420” during the mission, an early “Fishbed-C” aircraft. NARA via Mark Nankivil. |
|
MiG-21PF “Fishbed-D” interceptor with underwing
AA-2 “Atoll” missile. USAF. |
As a postscript, the RF-101 would soon be evaluated against the
same aircraft that had recently demonstrated success against the Voodoo, a
captured MiG-21F-13 in Nevada, given the code name “Have Doughnut.” Provided to the USAF by the Israeli
government after their intelligence services had arranged with an Iraqi pilot
to defect with his aircraft, the Fishbed-C was evaluated against a variety of
USAF and U.S. Navy aircraft beginning in February 1968 within the restricted
airspace of the Nevada Test Site. The
sole evaluation of the MiG-21 against a “clean” 363rd TRW RF-101 at 15,000 feet took place during a
40 minute flight on 15 March 1968. Acceleration was compared between the two
aircraft at both military and maximum power, yielding basically equal
results. During the two simulated engagements
that followed, the MiG-21 was able to keep up with and track the Voodoo through
its break turn and maneuvers during diving flight. The MiG-21 experienced significant buffet at
530 knots indicated airspeed and was unable to accelerate further while the
RF-101 continued to accelerate away to reach a speed of 650 knots. The results of the test flight indicated that
the best defensive maneuver for the RF-101 when engaged by a MiG-21 was a
straight unloaded acceleration with minimum maneuvering to defeat an “Atoll”
missile launch and separate at minimum altitude. A steep descent of 45-degree dive angle would
not only take advantage of ground clutter against the infrared seeker head of
the “Atoll,” but due to the high stick
forces and poor pitch rate of the MiG-21 at speeds above 500 KIAS at these
relatively low altitudes, the MiG pilot would have to be worried about ground
impact. An earlier evaluation flight
against an F-105D equipped with the same APR-25 RWR carried by the RF-101C showed that it was
vulnerable to the X-band SRD-5MK “High Fix” radar of the MiG-21F-13 and would not detect the radar until the MiG
was within launch range of the “Atoll”
missile at an average distance of 1.9 nautical miles and could not detect it at
all past 2.7 nautical miles.
Soon afterwards, an RF-4C was evaluated against the MiG-21. Unlike the Voodoo, the reconnaissance Phantom enjoyed a significant acceleration advantage
over the Fishbed-C at altitudes below 30,000 feet, particularly at military
power, giving the Phantom a wider set of escape options from pursuing
MiGs. The Phantom could carry its ECM equipment with a reduced drag penalty and,
unlike the Voodoo, could also carry a QRC-353A chaff dispenser which proved
effective in breaking radar lock of the MiG-21’s “High Fix” ranging radar. Also, having two sets of eyes in the Phantom was beneficial in picking up the very small visual
profile of the MiG-21 given the inability of the APR-25 RWR to give effective warning. While the results proved that the Voodoo
could survive against the MiG-21 under favorable conditions, flight evaluation
had shown that the RF-4C was significantly more survivable in the
threat environment over North Vietnam. The
decision to withdraw the Voodoo from combat operations over most of North
Vietnam had been clearly justified, and would not be reversed. However, events would prove that no matter
how old and worn the proud warhorse was becoming, the Voodoo was anything but
“being put out to pasture.”